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INTRODUCTION 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings have been called many things over 
the years:  a ―mess,‖1 a ―subtle minuet,‖2 and, most colorfully, a ―kabuki 
                                                          
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia College of Law. 
†Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas. The authors are grateful 
to the research assistants whose diligent work made this project possible:  Bryan Calvin, 
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dance.‖3  We, however, believe that they are—and should be—more than 
this.  The confirmation hearings held before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee are an essential part of the checks and balances system built 
into the United States Constitution.  These hearings are the point at which 
an independent judiciary confronts political accountability.  They are the 
point at which we as a nation, acting through our elected officials, accept, 
refute, and debate decisions of our High Court.  Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings, in short, are the way in which ―We the People‖ take 
ownership of the Constitution by deciding who we will allow to interpret it 
on our behalf. 
Despite the importance of the hearings, there has been very little 
empirical research examining exactly what happens when nominees appear 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee.  Political scientists have explored 
the dynamics of the confirmation process, but have rarely examined the 
hearings themselves.
4
  Work that has focused on the hearings directly has 
done so in only limited ways for the purpose of answering discrete research 
questions.
5
  The lack of a broad empirical foundation in this area is 
                                                          
early drafts from Paul Heald, Dan Lorentz, Liz Oldmixon, and Lisa Solowiej.  Finally, we 
thank Kirk Randazzo and the National Science Foundation for convening the Workshop on 
the Identification and Integration of Law and Court Data, which was fundamental to 
bringing this project to fruition.  Naturally, we are solely responsible for any errors in fact 
and/or judgment. 
 1. See Richard Brust, No More Kabuki Confirmations, 95 A.B.A. J. 39, 39 (2009) 
(quoting long-time critic of the nomination process Professor Stephen L. Carter). 
 2. See id. (quoting Senator Arlen Specter). 
 3. See id. (quoting then-Senator Joe Biden during his tenure on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee). 
 4. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices:  Who, 
When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1487–93 (2007) (discussing 
assumption in debate surrounding confirmations that nominees‘ ideology will remain similar 
during their service on the Court); P.S. Ruckman, Jr., The Supreme Court, Critical 
Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process, 55 J. POL. 793, 797–98 (1993) 
(analyzing the low confirmation rate for nominations that risk shifting the political balance 
of power on the Court); Jeffrey Segal, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices:  
Partisan and Institutional Politics, 49 J. POL. 998, 1000–02, 1012 (1987) (mapping through 
empirical analysis the factors affecting confirmation, such as Senate partisanship, lame duck 
status of the President, and strategic decision making); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial 
Model of Roll Call Voting:  Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in 
Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96, 96 (1992) (examining the effect of 
factors such as ideology of Senators and their constituents, qualifications of the nominee, 
presidential popularity, and interest group activity on Supreme Court nominations).  
 5. Margaret Williams and Lawrence Baum, for example, explored to what extent the 
substantive differences in terms of the questions posed to nominees are attributable to 
Bork‘s failed confirmation by coding all post-1953 hearings by the length and type of 
question. See Margaret Williams & Lawrence Baum, Questioning Judges About Their 
Decisions:  Supreme Court Nominees Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 90 
JUDICATURE 73, 76–78 (2006).  They provide evidence that both the length of senatorial 
questions and the number of questions focusing on the nominee‘s prior judicial record have 
increased. Id. Professors Guliuzza, Reagan and Barrett undertook a project similar to that of 
Williams and Baum. See Frank Guliuzza III et al., The Senate Judiciary Committee and 
Supreme Court Nominees:  Measuring the Dynamics of Confirmation Criteria, 56 J. POL. 
773, 774 (1994). They coded confirmation hearing transcripts for what they called 
  
surprising, particularly given the value such work would have to the 
emerging field of positive constitutional scholarship.  Scholars working in 
this growing area, such as Larry Kramer, Barry Friedman and Neil Siegel, 
are striving to create a realistic, empirically grounded understanding of the 
dynamic relationship between public opinion and constitutional 
development—a relationship that is on vivid display at Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings.  Scholarship among these authors varies.  Kramer, 
for example, argues that the public should reassert control over 
constitutional meaning through ―popular constitutionalism.‖6  Friedman in 
turn hypothesizes that constitutional development already tracks public 
opinion over time,
7
 while Siegel argues that individual justices play a 
significant role in shaping our constitutional values.
8
  Despite their 
differences, however, each of these scholars—and many others working in 
this area—would benefit from an empirically grounded understanding of 
how the confirmation process contributes to the interplay of public opinion 
and constitutional law. 
Empirical information quantifying what actually happens at the 
confirmation hearings is also useful to scholars who advocate changing the 
process.  Whether the confirmation process is or is not working properly, 
and how it should be fixed if it is not, has been the subject of endless legal, 
political, and popular debate.  Much of this angst is framed, explicitly or 
implicitly, by a yearning for a bygone era—usually thought to be sometime 
before Robert Bork‘s failed 1987 hearing—when confirmations were 
                                                          
―constitutional commentaries‖ by categorizing senatorial questions as involving ―character,‖ 
―competency‖ or ―constitutionalism.‖ Id. They determined that Bork was not asked more 
questions about constitutionalism than were other nominees, although he was asked more 
questions about character. Id. at 775–76. They also concluded that post-Bork and pre-Bork 
questioning patterns were more similar to each other than they were to the patterns seen at 
Bork‘s confirmation hearing. Id. at 785. Finally, Professors Czarnezki, Ford, and Ringhand 
used nominee hearing statements to ascertain each nominee‘s commitment to stare decisis, 
originalism as an interpretive method, and the protection of criminal defendants, and then 
compared those commitment levels to decisions that the nominees rendered once on the 
bench. See Jason J. Czarnezki, William K. Ford & Lori A. Ringhand, An Empirical Analysis 
of the Confirmation Hearings of the Justices of the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 127, 130 (2007). This research indicated that the statements about originalism 
and stare decisis had little correlation with subsequent rulings, while statements about the 
protection of criminal defendants had some predictive value.  Id. at 158. Professor Ringhand 
followed up on this project with an article examining how often nominees answer questions 
about particular named cases. See generally Lori A. Ringhand, “I‟m Sorry, I Can‟t Answer 
That”:  Positive Scholarship and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 10 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 331 (2008).  
 6. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 7–8 (2004).    
 7. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 17, 
367–68 (2009). 
 8. Neil S. Siegel, A Coase Theorem for Constitutional Theory, 5 (Duke Law 
Scholarship Repository, Working Paper No. 27, 2010), available at http:  
//scholarship.law.duke.edu/working_papers/27. 
  
believed to have been more civilized affairs, rather than the partisan ruckus 
they are seen as today.
9
  This belief that the process has changed—and 
changed for the worse—has led to a chorus of calls for reform.  Some 
reformers propose that senatorial questioning stay clear of substantive issue 
areas and be limited to inquiries regarding a nominee‘s ―judicial 
philosophy.‖10  Others have gone the opposite direction, advocating more 
robust and wide-reaching exchanges between the senators and the 
nominees.
11
  Still others have called for dramatic changes, such as the 
imposition of supermajority rules on Supreme Court confirmations,
12
 and 
even for the abolition of the confirmation process entirely.
13
  
These reform proposals, like the growing body of positive constitutional 
scholarship discussed above, clearly would benefit from empirical data 
quantifying what actually happens at Supreme Court confirmation 
hearings.  Empirical work in both of these areas, however, has been 
stymied by a lack of basic data. What do the senators ask about and what 
do the nominees talk about?  Do these things vary depending on partisan 
affiliations of the senators and nominees?  Do they vary depending on the 
race or gender of the nominee?  Have they changed over time?  
Until now, scholars working in these areas have had no comprehensive 
empirical information with which to answer questions such as these.  The 
Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings Database introduced here remedies 
this situation.  Its content analyzes and codes every senatorial question 
asked and every nominee response given at every open public hearing held 
by the Senate Judiciary Committee at which a nominee for the Supreme 
Court testified.  In introducing the database, we also present a description 
of the patterns underlying the dialogue that transpires at the hearings:  we 
                                                          
 9. For a review of the literature in this area, see generally Jeff Yates & William 
Gillespie, Supreme Court Power Play:  Assessing the Appropriate Role of the Senate in the 
Confirmation Process, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1056–57, 1065–69 (2001). 
 10. See Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 863 
(1990) (discussing the argument that confirmation questioning should be limited to 
―responsible ideological review‖ because excessive Senate participation in judicial selection 
damages the public‘s perception of the Court‘s independence). 
 11. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice:  Law and Politics in Judicial 
Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 38 (2006), http:  
//www.thepocketpart.org/ylj-online/supreme-court/27-questioning-justice-law-and-politics-
in-judicial-confirmation-hearings (proposing that Senators ask Supreme Court nominees 
how they would have voted in cases that have already been decided in order to obtain 
information without compromising the autonomy of the courts).  
 12. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the 
Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543, 571 (2005) (concluding that a 
supermajority confirmation process would be appropriate because the Supreme Court can 
create new constitutional norms and because the small number of justices creates a greater 
danger of political imbalance in the Court‘s composition).  
 13. See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 299, 
300 (2004) (recommending a ―Tournament of Judges‖ where elite federal judges compete 
for a promotion to the Supreme Court).  
  
determine whether the quantity and type of questions asked of nominees 
has changed over the years, which issues have generated the most 
discussion at the hearings, whether the issues discussed vary depending on 
the party of the appointing president and that of the questioning senator, 
and whether different issues are presented to female and minority 
nominees.  
Our findings are wide-ranging.  Some simply provide empirical 
validation of conventional wisdom about the hearings (the hearings have, 
for example, gotten longer).  Others challenge that wisdom:  the Bork 
hearing is less of an outlier in several ways than is frequently assumed, and 
abortion has not dominated the dialogue between the senators and the 
nominees.  We also present findings that will help scholars tease out the 
complex mechanisms through which the confirmation process connects 
public opinion to constitutional law.  For example, we find that there is 
substantial variation over time in the issues discussed at the hearings, and 
that there are notable disparities in the issues addressed by Democratic 
versus Republican senators.  Finally, we present evidence that speaks 
directly to the fairness of the process itself:  for example, we find that 
women and minority nominees face a significantly different hearing 
environment than do white male nominees.  
This paper has three parts.  Part I provides some background on the 
Senate confirmation hearings and describes the new data introduced here.  
Part II analyzes that data and presents our findings.  Part III sets forth some 
tentative conclusions about what the data examined in Part II tell us about 
the confirmation process, and discusses how future research can build on 
the empirical foundation we establish with this work.  
I. THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS DATABASE 
Article 2, Section 2 of the United States Constitution states that the 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, has the power to 
appoint justices to the Supreme Court of the United States.
14
  To assist in 
its part of this process, the Senate in 1816 established the Committee on the 
Judiciary as a standing committee.
15
  For the first hundred years or so of its 
history, the Committee did its work quietly:  it discussed the nominees in 
private, did not ask them to appear in person, and rarely took public 
testimony about them.
16
  This changed in 1925, when nominee Harlan 
Stone, at the request of President Calvin Coolidge, took the unprecedented 
                                                          
 14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 15. History of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, http:  //judiciary.senate.gov/about/history/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).  
 16. Id. 
  
step of agreeing to appear before the Committee.
17
  Stone‘s appearance was 
limited, however, to defending himself against charges (stemming from the 
Teapot Dome scandal) involving his earlier work as Attorney General.
18
  
In 1939, Felix Frankfurter became the first nominee to take unrestricted 
questions in an open, transcribed, public hearing.
19
  Between Frankfurter‘s 
hearing in 1939 and John Harlan‘s testimony in 1955, nominees appeared 
only intermittently.
20
  Some notable jurists nominated in this time frame—
such as Chief Justice Earl Warren—did not appear.21  Since 1955, however, 
every Supreme Court nominee other than those whose names were 
withdrawn before hearings began (e.g., Douglas Ginsburg and Harriet 
Miers) has appeared and testified before the Committee.
22
 
The dataset introduced in this paper includes every hearing since 1939 at 
which a nominee appeared to testify.  Nominees who underwent separate 
confirmation hearings for an associate justice and then a chief justice 
nomination are coded separately for each appearance.  The dataset also 
includes nominees who appeared to testify but were not confirmed (e.g., 
Robert Bork and Nixon nominees Harrold Carswell and Clement 
Haynsworth).  It does not, however, include the portion of the Clarence 
Thomas hearing that was re-opened solely for the purposes of taking 
testimony regarding the accusations of sexual harassment made by law 
professor Anita Hill.  Nominees included in the dataset, along with their 
appointing president and confirmation outcome, are listed in Appendix A.  
When possible, the data have been collected from the official Senate 
Judiciary Committee transcripts as available either online at the Senate‘s 
webpage,
23
 or in The Supreme Court of the United Sates:  Hearings and 
Reports on Successful and Unsuccessful Nominations of Supreme Court 
Justices by the Senate Judiciary Committee 1916–1975.24 The Sotomayor 
hearing was coded from the transcript available at the New York Times 
webpage.
25
  
                                                          
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See infra Appendix A (listing every instance where a nominee has appeared 
personally after Frankfurter pioneered the practice in 1939).  
 20. See id. (demonstrating that only one nominee appeared before the Committee 
during this time). 
 21. See id. Chief Justice Earl Warren was appointed by President Eisenhower and 
confirmed in 1953. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 24, 
27 (2000). 
 22. See infra Appendix A. 
 23. Nomination Hearings for Sitting Supreme Court Justices, U.S. SENATE, http:  
//www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/one_item_and_teasers/Supreme_Court_Nomination
_Hearings.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
 24.  THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:  HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON 
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE 
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916–1975 (Roy M. Merksy & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 2007). 
 25. The transcripts used to code this study are available at 
  
The unit of analysis in the dataset is a change of speaker, meaning that a 
new observation begins whenever the speaker changes.  For example, the 
following discussion between Sonia Sotomayor and Senator Hatch 
represents two observations, one for Hatch and one for Sotomayor:   
SEN. HATCH:  All right. In what way does the Court‘s observation that 
the Second Amendment codified the preexisting, fundamental right to 
bear arms affect your conclusion that the Second Amendment does not 
protect a fundamental right?  
 
JUDGE SOTOMAYOR:  My conclusion in the Maloney case or in the 
U.S. Sanchez-Villar was based on precedence [sic] and the holding of 
precedence [sic] that the Second Circuit did not apply to the states.
26
 
Each comment is coded by both its primary issue and any relevant 
subissues.  Senatorial comments and nominee comments are coded 
separately and therefore need not (although usually do) involve the same 
issue and subissue(s).  A single unit of analysis can have only one issue, 
but may have multiple subissues.  So, for example, a senatorial comment 
asking about the nominee‘s opinion on race and gender discrimination 
would have one issue (―civil rights‖) and two subissue codes (―race‖ and 
―gender‖).  Subissue codes are unique to their issue in that the same 
subissue does not appear in multiple issue codes.   
The issue and subissue codes used in the project are based on the Policy 
Agendas Project,
27
 with some confirmation-specific codes added.  The 
issue codes include areas such as ―civil rights,‖ ―criminal justice,‖ and 
―judicial philosophy.‖ Subissues include such topics as ―gender 
discrimination,‖ ―racial discrimination,‖ and ―religion:  free exercise‖ (in 
the civil rights issue area); ―Miranda warnings‖ and ―white collar crime‖ 
(in the criminal justice issue area); and ―precedent‖ and ―original intent‖ (in 
the judicial philosophy issue area).  We also have created an issue code for 
―chatter.‖  The purpose of this code is to capture non-substantive 
discussion, such as the scheduling of breaks and other social chitchat that 
occurs frequently among the senators and nominees.  Chatter also includes 
discussions of the nominee‘s education, family and background.  A 
complete list of the issues and subissues coded is available in Appendix B.  
Each comment is also coded for identification variables, such as the 
name of the questioning senator, the questioning senator‘s political party, 
the party holding majority control in the Senate at the time of the hearing, 
                                                          
 http://www.nytimes.com by searching ―Sotomayor confirmation hearings.‖ 
 26. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:  Before the  S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 87 (2009).   
 27. Frank Baumgartner & Bryan Jones, Topic Codebook, POLICY AGENDAS PROJECT, 
http:  //www.policyagendas.org/page/topic-codebook (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).  
  
and the party of the nominating president.  Political party variables are 
coded as of the date of the hearing.  So, for example, a senator such as 
Arlen Specter, who served on the Judiciary Committee as both a 
Republican and a Democrat, will appear in the data as both a Republican 
and a Democrat, with his party affiliation depending on the date of the 
hearing being coded.  
We subjected the data to extensive reliability testing.  The data are, 
overall, very reliable.  The average agreement rate between coders for all 
variables is 91.2% and the average kappa is 0.89, which is ―almost perfect‖ 
by one commonly used metric.
28
  While some variables exhibit weaker 
intercoder agreement, no variable does worse than ―moderate‖ in terms of 
kappa and almost all exhibit ―substantial‖ to ―almost perfect‖ intercoder 
agreement rates. A full reliability analysis report is available in Appendix 
C.  
II. DATA ANALYSIS 
This section analyzes the data described above. Specifically, we examine 
four aspects of Supreme Court confirmation hearings:  (1) the quantity of 
comments over time; (2) the issues and subissues addressed, and the extent 
to which those issue areas and subissues have changed over time; (3) the 
significance of the party affiliation of the appointing president and of the 
questioning senators in the topics addressed at the hearings; and (4) 
whether the issues raised at the hearings vary with respect to nominee race 
and gender. 
Our findings are notable.  First, we find that the number of comments at 
the hearings has increased, but that this increase, contrary to common 
assertions,
29
 did not begin with the Bork hearings.  Second, we find that the 
issue areas addressed at the hearings have varied over time, but that 
discussions of civil rights issues have been dominant since 1970.  We also 
find that the topics addressed within the civil rights area itself have 
changed over time; most notably, comments about racial discrimination 
have ebbed while comments about gender and sexual orientation 
discrimination have increased.  Each of these findings, as we explain in 
Part III, has implications for our understanding of how the confirmation 
hearings help to shape the development of constitutional law.  
We also make additional findings that will facilitate a richer appreciation 
                                                          
 28. See J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer Agreement 
for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977). 
 29. See, e.g., Stephen J. Wermeil, Confirming the Constitution:  The Role of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 130–31 (1993) (asserting that the 
transformative nature of Bork‘s lengthy and voluminous hearing process established a ―new 
norm‖ for confirmation hearings). 
  
of the confirmation process.  We find, for example, that there is significant 
variation in the questions asked by Democratic and Republican senators:  
Democrats ask more questions about criminal justice issues, while 
Republicans dominate questioning about judicial philosophy, statutory 
interpretation, and national security.  We also find that abortion has not 
played as important a role in the hearings as is often assumed, even after 
accounting for the fact that Roe v. Wade
30
 was not decided until quite late 
in the time period covered by the dataset.  Finally—and perhaps most 
importantly—we find that women and minority nominees face a different 
hearing environment than do white male nominees.  They are asked more 
substantive questions overall, and more questions about their judicial 
philosophy.  Minority nominees also are asked more questions about 
criminal justice.  
A. The Quantity of Comments Over Time 
Figure 1 reports the number of comments made by nominees and 
senators at Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings from 1939 to 
2009.  The nominees are aligned along the x-axis, while the y-axis reports 
the total number of comments made by nominees (the dashed line) and 
senators (the solid line). This figure reveals two significant things.  First, 
note the strong association between the number of comments made by 
nominees and senators.  Using the hearing as the unit of analysis, the 
correlation between the number of comments made by nominees and 
senators is 0.992 (p < 0.001).  As such, it is evident that our data reflect the 
fact that confirmation hearings take place in a question and answer format, 
with senators traditionally moving first by asking questions, followed by 
the nominees responding in turn. 
Second, the number of comments made by both nominees and senators 
has increased rather dramatically over time.  For example, from 1939–
1981, the average number of comments made by nominees was 181, while 
the average number of comments made by senators was 253.  Since 
Rehnquist‘s Chief Justice hearing in 1986, however, the average number of 
comments made by nominees was 749 and the average number of 
c o m m e n t s  m a d e  b y  s e n a t o r s  w a s  9 8 7 .  
While the Bork hearings represent the greatest number of comments, 
with 1587 statements made by Bork and 1931 remarks made by senators, it 
is notable that the increase in the number of statements made at the 
hearings began not with Bork, but with Rehnquist‘s nomination for Chief 
Justice in 1986.  During that hearing, Rehnquist made 727 statements, 
while senators contributed 1135 questions and comments.  Thus, while the 
                                                          
 30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
  
Bork hearing is certainly an outlier in terms of the number of statements 
made, Bork‘s nomination does not represent the point at which the number 
of comments made at confirmation hearings saw its most radical 
transformation.  Rather, Figure 1 reveals that the increase in the number of 
comments made at confirmation hearings was initiated at Rehnquist‘s 
hearing for the position of Chief Justice. 
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B. Issues and Subissues  
Table 1 reports the issues addressed by senators and nominees who 
appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1939 to 2009.  As 
this table illustrates, a plurality of comments (35.2%) at the Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearings of Supreme Court nominees involve 
confirmation chatter.  The bulk of the chatter category (57.1%) is made up 
of miscellaneous talk among the senators, including non-substantive 
clarifications such as ―excuse me,‖ or ―could you repeat that,‖ as well as 
senatorial discussions of scheduling and social chitchat.  About a quarter of 
the chatter category (24.3%) involves discussions of the nominees‘ 
background and education, while the remainder involves discussion of 
media coverage of the nominations and pre-hearing coaching.  Note that 
this category does not include senatorial statements posing as questions (a 
common practice), requests for clarifications that have a substantive 
component, or single word comments (such as ―yes‖) that carry substantive 
meaning when considered in context.  
Looking at Table 1, it is tempting to note that the members of the 
Judiciary Committee could cut the number of comments made at the 
hearings by more than a third simply by engaging in less chatter.  We admit 
to considering making such a suggestion.  But two things about the chatter 
issue area compel us to resist this urge, and to treat the category with more 
respect. 
First, the largest contributors to the senatorial chatter category are the 
Table 1. The Issues Addressed by Senators and Nominees who Testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2009 
Issue       Senators   Nominees       Total 
 
Hearing Administration/Chatter  41.8% (6,658)  26.4% (3,134)  35.2% (9,792) 
Civil Rights    26.8% (4,266)  33.8% (4,003)  29.8% (8,269) 
Judicial Philosophy   11.2% (1,777)  14.1% (1,667)  12.4% (3,444) 
Criminal Justice     7.7% (1,231)  9.8% (1,161)  8.6% (2,392) 
Government Operations   3.3% (521)  4.1% (485)  3.6% (1,006) 
Court Administration   2.9% (466)  3.8% (446)  3.3% (912) 
Federalism    1.1% (177)  1.5% (177)  1.3% (354) 
Statutory Interpretation   0.8% (127)  1.1% (127)  0.9% (254) 
Banking and Finance   0.8% (123)  1.0% (120)  0.9% (243) 
Labor and Employment   0.6% (98)  0.8% (96)  0.7% (194) 
Standing/Access to Courts   0.6% (91)  0.7% (85)  0.6% (176) 
Best/Favorite Justices   0.4% (58)  0.5% (58)  0.4% (116) 
National Defense    0.4% (59)  0.5% (55)  0.4% (114) 
Other Issues    1.7% (276)  2.1% (247)  1.9% (523) 
 
Totals     100.1% (15,928)  100.2% (11,861)  100% (27,789)   
 
The unit of analysis is the change of speaker. The column entries represent the percentage of comments regarding each 
issue area. The percentages do not necessarily sum to 100% due to rounding. The numbers in parentheses indicate the 
total number of comments pertaining to each issue area. Issue areas representing less than 0.4% of the column totals are 
combined into the “Other Issues” category. The data contain information on Supreme Court nominees, both confirmed 
and unconfirmed, who appeared in front of an open session of the Senate Judiciary Committee since 1939. 
  
committee chairs, who make up almost half of all chatter.  Although only 
speculative, our impression as coders is that most of these comments 
consist of necessary discussions of hearing logistics and other scheduling 
matters, in addition to the introductory exchanges in which the nominee 
discusses his or her education and background.  Second, as we discuss 
below, the percentage of chatter at the hearings appears to be leveling off 
rather than increasing, suggesting that the senators themselves are moving 
toward viewing their role as a more substantive one.  This also assures us 
that the practice of televising the hearings, which began in 1981 with the 
O‘Connor hearing,31 has not increased chatter among the senators. 
Table 1 also reveals that three issues have dominated the substance of 
the hearings:  civil rights, judicial philosophy and criminal justice.  The 
most common substantive issue area addressed at the hearings is civil 
rights.  Civil rights dialogue constitutes 26.8% of all senatorial comments 
and 33.8% of all nominee comments contained in the dataset.  Taking 
senatorial and nominee comments together, statements about civil rights 
thus comprise 29.8% of all of our observations.  Judicial philosophy, which 
includes comments about methods of constitutional interpretation, the role 
of the Court, and judicial activism, is a distant second, constituting only 
12.4% of all comments.  Criminal justice, including discussions of criminal 
procedure, capital punishment and juvenile justice, rounds out the top three 
substantive areas with 8.6% of the total comments.  The remaining issue 
areas reported in Table 1 are discussed relatively infrequently, with no 
single issue area representing more than 4% of commentary.  
Table 2 reports the most frequently addressed non-chatter issue area by 
nominee.  This table reveals that civil rights, judicial philosophy, and 
criminal justice have dominated the hearings not just overall, but since their 
inception.  Civil rights has been the most frequently discussed issue area at 
all of the hearings since 1971.  It was also the most frequently addressed 
issue area in twenty-one of the thirty-one hearings in the dataset as a whole.  
Judicial philosophy, in contrast, was the most discussed issue at only four 
of the hearings, while criminal justice dominated an additional four.  Only 
two hearings, that of Byron White (1962) and Warren Burger (1969) were 
dominated by issues other than these three:  White‘s hearing focused  
                                                          
 31. Michael Comiskey, Not Guilty:  The News Media in the Supreme Court 
Confirmation Process, 15 J.L. & POL. 1, 29 (1999). 
  
on issues of standing and access to courts, while Burger‘s hearing for Chief 
Justice devoted a substantial amount of attention to issues implicating 
judicial administration. 
While the tables examined above provide a great deal of information 
regarding the issues discussed in the Senate Judiciary Committee, they do 
not speak to whether there have been changes over time in the percentages 
of comments addressing each issue at each hearing.  Identifying such 
temporal changes is key to exploring connections between public opinion 
(as evidenced through senatorial questioning) and constitutional change.  
As such, we provide below a more fine-grained analysis of temporal 
changes within the chatter, civil rights, criminal justice, and judicial 
philosophy issue areas.  We also break down the broad civil rights category 
and examine temporal changes in several of the subissues included within 
that issue area. 
1. Hearing administration and chatter 
Figure 2 presents the percentage of comments regarding hearing 
Table 2. The Most Frequently Addressed Non-Chatter Issue by Senators and Nominees, per Nominee, who 
Testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2009 
                  Most Frequently Addressed Issue    
Nominee Name (Year)          Senators                         Nominees  
 
Frankfurter (1939)  Civil Rights (24.5%)   Civil Rights (31.8%) 
Jackson (1941)   Criminal Justice (21.9%)   Criminal Justice (97.0%) 
Harlan (1955)   Judicial Philosophy (15.6%)   Judicial Philosophy (15.6%) 
Brennan (1957)   Civil Rights (48.0%)   Civil Rights (58.6%) 
Whittaker (1957)   Civil Rights (21.6%)   Civil Rights (21.1%)  
Stewart (1959)   Judicial Philosophy (29.7%)   Judicial Philosophy (49.0%) 
White (1962)   Standing/Access to Courts (25.0%)  Standing/Access to Courts (42.9%) 
Goldberg (1962)   Judicial Philosophy (29.8%)   Judicial Philosophy (46.4%) 
Fortas (1965)   Criminal Justice (16.9%)   Criminal Justice (19.6%) 
Marshall (1967)   Criminal Justice (46.7%)   Criminal Justice (52.5%) 
Fortas (1968)   Criminal Justice (21.4%)   Criminal Justice (23.9%) 
Thornberry (1968)  Civil Rights (40.4%)   Civil Rights (58.0%) 
Burger (1969)   Judicial Administration (25.6%)  Judicial Administration (41.7%) 
Haynsworth (1969)  Civil Rights (4.9%)   Civil Rights (6.7%) 
Carswell (1970)   Civil Rights (45.1%)   Civil Rights (49.3%) 
Blackmun (1970)   Judicial Philosophy (12.3%)   Judicial Philosophy (15.6%) 
Powell (1971)   Civil Rights (47.7%)   Civil Rights (54.6%) 
Rehnquist (1971)   Civil Rights (31.6%)   Civil Rights (38.5%) 
Stevens (1975)   Civil Rights (22.0%)   Civil Rights (23.9%) 
O'Connor (1981)   Civil Rights (23.5%)   Civil Rights (27.9%) 
Rehnquist (1986)   Civil Rights (24.3%)   Civil Rights (33.4%) 
Scalia (1986)   Civil Rights (25.2%)   Civil Rights (31.6%) 
Bork (1987)   Civil Rights (36.9%)   Civil Rights (45.2%) 
Kennedy (1987)   Civil Rights (24.7%)   Civil Rights (28.0%) 
Souter (1990)   Civil Rights (29.9%)   Civil Rights (36.8%) 
Thomas (1991)   Civil Rights (32.0%)   Civil Rights (44.9%) 
Ginsburg (1993)   Civil Rights (28.6%)   Civil Rights (39.7%) 
Breyer (1994)   Civil Rights (21.5%)   Civil Rights (27.2%) 
Roberts (2005)   Civil Rights (37.7%)   Civil Rights (44.0%) 
Alito (2006)   Civil Rights (21.9%)   Civil Rights (26.5%) 
Sotomayor (2009)   Civil Rights (23.0%)   Civil Rights (29.5%) 
 
The numbers in parenthesis indicate the percentage of comments represented by the most frequently addressed issue 
area. The data contain information on Supreme Court nominees, both confirmed and unconfirmed, who appeared in 
front of an open session of the Senate Judiciary Committee since 1939. 
  
administration and chatter made by senators and nominees from 1939 to 
2009.  The nominees in this figure, and in those that follow, are arranged 
along the x-axis, while the y-axis represents the percentage of comments 
involving hearing administration and chatter.  Comments by nominees are 
indicated by the dashed line, while comments from senators are denoted by 
the solid line.  
As Figure 2 makes clear, there has been substantial temporal variation 
with respect to the percentage of comments involving hearing 
administration and chatter.  For example, more than 90% of the comments 
made by nominees and senators during the Haynsworth (1969) hearing 
involved chatter.  Similarly, about 80% of the comments proffered by 
nominees and senators at the Harlan (1955) and Whittaker (1957) hearings 
were chatter.  In more recent years, however, chatter levels dropped.  For 
example, the percentage of chatter from senators prior to 1971 was 46.1%, 
compared to 40.6% in the post-1970 era.  While this supports commonly 
made assertions that confirmations hearings used to be more chummy 
affairs, it also makes clear that senators and nominees have striven to be 
more substantive in recent hearings, at least in terms of the issue areas they 
choose to address.  Opinions may differ, but we do not rue this 
development. 
2. Civil rights 
As shown in Figure 3, civil rights has dominated the substantive issue 
areas covered at the hearings overall, and has done so with particular force 
since 1970.  This figure plots the percentage of comments made regarding 
civil rights from 1939 to 2009.  While there was notable variation in the 
pre-1970 era, with the Jackson (1941) and White (1962) hearings 
containing no discussion of civil rights, it is apparent that civil rights has 
become an essential part of the confirmation hearings.  In fact, since 1971, 
interrogation by senators regarding a nominee‘s views of the pressing civil 
rights issues of the day has never represented less than 20% of all questions 
asked at the hearings. 
The dominance of civil rights comments is particularly notable given 
that the number of comments likely to have been motivated by civil rights 
concerns may be somewhat understated in the data.  It is not unusual for 
senators to present substantive concerns about an issue area in comments 
that are, under our coding rules, coded as ―judicial philosophy.‖  This is 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  s o  i n  t h e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  i s s u e  
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area.  The most obvious example of this is the 1959 hearing of Potter 
Stewart. Stewart was nominated just five years after the Court‘s landmark 
Brown v. Board of Education
32
 decision and his hearing was held at a time 
in which the federal courts were still sorting out how aggressively they 
would oversee school desegregation.  In this political environment, Stewart 
was bombarded with questions from Southern Democrats about the dangers 
of judges replacing ―the law‖ with their ―personal notions‖ of good policy, 
the problem of judges trying to ―amend‖ the Constitution, and the 
importance of stare decisis.
33
  It seems unlikely that these comments, 
coming at the time and from the senators that they did, were unrelated to 
Brown.  Indeed, the Senators at the Stewart hearing often made the 
connection with Brown explicit.  Consider, for example, the following 
comment by Senator Ervin of North Carolina:   
I think the Brown v. the Board of Education [sic] was a most unfortunate 
decision from the standpoint of law, Constitutional law in the United 
States . . . .  In the first place, the Court said that it couldn‘t turn the clock 
back to 1868 when the Amendment was ratified or even to 1869 when 
Plessy v. Ferguson was decided, and yet since Constitutional provisions 
are to be interpreted to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 
people who drew them and approved them, that is exactly what the 
Supreme Court should have done.  They should have turned the clock 
back to 1868 when the Amendment was ratified.
34
 
 Often, however, the senators did not link their opinions about Brown so 
directly to their comments about judicial philosophy.  Consider this 
question by Senator Johnston of South Carolina:  ―Are you going to be 
what you call a ‗creative judge‘ or are you going to to [sic] follow the law 
and the precedent?‖35 
Under our coding rules, Senator Ervin‘s comment would be coded as 
involving civil rights, while Senator Johnston‘s would be coded as one of 
judicial philosophy.  This is so despite the fact that Senator Johnston‘s 
statement is highly likely to have been as motivated by Brown (which he 
discussed shortly after the exchange in which the above comment appears) 
as was Senator Ervin‘s.  We cannot presume to accurately perceive 
senatorial motivations, however, so comments such as Johnston‘s which 
a r e  n o t  a r t i c u l a t e d  a s  c i v i l  r i g h t s  i s s u e s  a r e 
                                                          
 32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 33. See, e.g., Nomination of Potter Stewart to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 115, 123–24 
(1959) (question by Sen. Samuel Ervin, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 34. Id. at 124. 
 35. Id. at 20–21. 
  
coded in our data as raising issues of judicial philosophy rather than civil 
rights.
36
  Thus, the actual number of comments motivated in fact by 
concerns about civil rights may be higher than is reflected in our findings. 
Regardless, civil rights issues clearly have, even under our conservative 
coding regime, dominated the hearings at which the nominees have 
testified.  Civil rights, however, is a broad issue area.  It includes, among 
other things, race, gender, age and disability discrimination; speech and 
religious freedom; and the right to keep and bear arms.  To more fully 
understand the role this issue area has played in the hearings, it is therefore 
worth examining the prevalence and distribution of the subissues within it.  
As Table 3 illustrates, statements involving discrimination constitute a 
plurality of comments within the civil rights issue area.  Specifically, 
discussions of racial discrimination comprise 23% of civil rights 
comments.  Gender and sexual orientation discrimination constitute an 
additional 12.7%, while age and disability discrimination add 1.8%.  
Combined, dialogue involving discrimination thus constitutes 37.5% of the 
comments within the civil rights issue area.  Freedom of speech/religion is 
the next most commonly discussed civil rights subissue, followed by non-
                                                          
 36. Sonia Sotomayor‘s hearing provides additional examples of this.  Many of the 
comments from her hearing coded as ―judicial philosophy‖ involved whether she would 
allow her personal experiences to influence how she decided cases.  To those familiar with 
her nomination, such comments likely appear to have been based on concerns of racial bias 
allegedly revealed in a series of speeches Sotomayor had given before her nomination.  See 
generally Sonia Sotomayor, Judge, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, A Latina 
Judge‘s Voice (Oct. 26, 2001) (transcript available at http:  
//www.law.berkeley.edu/4982.htm).  
Table 3. The Civil Rights Issues Addressed by Senators and Nominees who Testified at the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2009 
Issue       Senators   Nominees       Total 
 
Racial Discrimination   23.5% (1,001)  22.4% (897)  23.0% (1,898) 
Freedom of Speech/Religion  16.1% (686)  16.9% (676)  16.5% (1,362) 
Right to Privacy (non-abortion)  14.7% (626)  14.7% (590)  14.7% (1,216) 
Gender/Sexual Orientation Discrimination 12.7% (542)  12.7% (507)  12.7% (1,049) 
Abortion Rights    12.5% (534)  11.9% (477)  12.2% (1,011) 
Voting Rights    9.1% (388)  9.2% (369)  9.2% (757) 
Anti-Government Activities  4.1% (176)  3.8% (153)  4.0% (329) 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms  1.6% (70)  1.8% (72)  1.7% (142) 
Handicap/Disease Discrimination  1.4% (59)  1.2% (49)  1.3% (108) 
Age Discrimination   0.5% (22)  0.5% (21)  0.5% (43) 
Other Civil Rights Issues   11.8% (505)  12.4% (495)  12.1% (1,000) 
 
Totals      108% (4,609)  107.5% (4,306)  107.9% (8,915) 
 
The unit of analysis is the change of speaker. The column entries represent the percentage of comments regarding each 
civil rights issue area. The percentages exceed 100% because a single comment by a senator or nominee can fall within 
multiple civil rights issue areas (e.g., abortion and freedom of speech). The numbers in parentheses indicate the total 
number of comments pertaining to each issue area falling within the civil rights category. Miscellaneous civil rights issue 
areas and civil rights issue areas representing less than 0.4% of the column totals are combined into the “Other Civil 
Rights Issues” category. The number of comments exceeds the number of civil rights comments reported in Table 1 
because a single statement by a senator or nominee can touch on multiple civil rights issues. The data contain 
information on Supreme Court nominees, both confirmed and unconfirmed, who appeared in front of an open session 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee since 1939. 
  
abortion privacy and, at only 12.2% of the issue area, abortion rights.  
Dialogue implicating voting rights represent 9.2% of the civil rights 
category, while treatments of anti-government activities constitute 4% this 
issue.  Debates concerning the Second Amendment, first appearing at 
O‘Connor‘s hearing in 1981 and constituting 8.8% of all dialogue at the 
Sotomayor hearing in 2009, make up only 1.7% of civil rights discourse.  
Below, we provide a detailed treatment of the five most frequently 
occurring subissues involving civil rights.  
a. Race and gender/sexual orientation discrimination 
The prevalence of racial discrimination comments is not surprising, 
given the importance of racial justice issues within constitutional law, as 
well as the fact that all but two of the hearings contained in the dataset 
occurred after the Supreme Court‘s Brown decision.37  Conflicts about 
racial issues, so prevalent in society throughout much of the time period 
covered in the dataset, plainly infiltrated the confirmation hearings.  
Interestingly, however, the dominance of race discrimination comments 
may be waning.  While remaining the most frequently mentioned subissue 
within the civil rights issue area, the percentage of civil rights comments 
involving racial discrimination has actually declined since the mid-1980s.  
Figure 4 plots the percentage of civil rights commentary involving racial 
discrimination.  As this figure makes clear, discussions of racial 
discrimination dominated the civil rights category for several nominees, 
most notably Harlan (1955), Stewart (1959), and Haynsworth (1969), but 
questions regarding racial discrimination have tapered off since the mid-
1980s. 
This decline may well reflect a mid-1980s ―constitutional consensus‖ 
that the Constitution proscribes (and allows Congress to penalize) 
intentional discrimination against racial minorities.
38
  A comparison of 
Rehnquist‘s 1986 Chief Justice hearing, Bork‘s failed 1987 hearing, and 
Kennedy‘s subsequent 1987 hearing illustrates this point.   
                                                          
 37. A new paper speculates that nominee testimony became the norm after 1955 
precisely because of Brown.  Dion Fargabis & Justin Wedeking, ―No Hints, No Forecasts, 
No Previews‖:  An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Nominee Candor From Harlan to 
Kagan, 2011 LAW & SOC. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at  
http://www.uky.edu/~jpwede2/NoHints_Revised.pdf.  
 38. See Ringhand, supra note 5, at 345 (asserting that Brown is ―surely among the most 
settled of our settled cases‖). 
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Rehnquist, the first of these nominees to face the Judiciary Committee, 
was confirmed as Chief Justice, but only after repeatedly disavowing a 
memo written when he was a law clerk that appeared to endorse Plessy v. 
Ferguson
39
 (the 1896 case that validated segregation and the ―separate but 
equal‖ doctrine).40  A year later, in 1987, Robert Bork told the Committee 
that Brown (which overturned Plessy) had been correctly decided, but 
appeared ambivalent about the constitutionality of poll taxes, racial 
covenants, and landmark civil rights legislation.
41
  Bork was not confirmed.  
Justice Kennedy, nominated for the seat Bork failed to acquire, affirmed 
both Brown and The Civil Rights Act of 1964, and spoke strongly in favor 
of the federal government‘s power to prohibit racial discrimination.42  
S i n c e  
Kennedy, no nominee has seriously refuted Brown or the legitimacy of 
federal anti-discrimination laws, and racial discrimination, perhaps 
consequently, has become less dominant in the hearings. 
As comments regarding racial discrimination declined, comments about 
gender and sexual orientation discrimination arrived to fill the gap.  As 
shown above in Table 3, discussions about gender and sexual orientation 
discrimination constitute 12.7% of the civil rights comments in the dataset, 
making this the fourth most frequently commented upon civil rights 
subissue in the dataset. As shown in Figure 5, however, all of the activity in 
this area has occurred since 1970, with most of it coming after 1975. 
The emergence of these issues in the 1970s is not surprising. The 1970s 
were pivotal for both the women‘s rights and the gay rights movements.  
The National Organization of Women marched on Washington, the Equal 
Rights Amendment was re-introduced in Congress, and Gloria Steinman 
founded Ms. Magazine.
43
  Gay rights activists also gained momentum in 
the 1970s. The Stonewall Riot, widely considered the birth of the gay rights 
movement, occurred in New York City in 1969.
44
 The country‘s first gay 
p r i d e  p a r a d e s ,  
                                                          
 39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 40. Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United 
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 161–62 (1987). 
 41. The Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 152, 155, 253, 348 
(1989). 
 42. The Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 149, 151–52, 
182–83 (1989). 
 43. See BARBARA BURRELL, WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:  A REFERENCE 
HANDBOOK 62–63, 203 (2004) (providing a history of the women‘s political movement); 
DOROTHY MCBRIDE-STETSON, WOMEN‘S RIGHTS IN THE USA:  POLICY DEBATES AND 
GENDER ROLES 36–37 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing NOW‘s campaign for passage of the Equal 
Rights Amendment). 
 44. DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL:  THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION 1 
(2004). 
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organized in remembrance of Stonewall, followed in 1970, and Ann Arbor, 
Michigan passed the first gay-rights ordinance in 1972.
45
  As with racial 
conflicts, it would be surprising if societal changes as revolutionary as 
these were not reflected in the confirmation hearings.   
b. Speech and religious freedoms 
As noted in Table 3, speech and religious freedom is the second most 
frequently occurring subissue within the civil rights area, constituting 
16.5% of all observations.  This subissue includes discussions of, among 
other things, flag burning, school prayer, obscenity, free exercise of 
religion, and campaign finance regulation.  
Unlike the dialogue concerning race and gender/sexual orientation 
discrimination, comments involving speech and religious freedom have 
been relatively evenly dispersed over time, particularly since the late 
1960s, as reported in Figure 6.  While not every hearing involved 
substantial discussions of these issues, there was no time period in the last 
forty years in which this subissue did not play a relatively important role. 
Rather, its prevalence has remained quite stable over time, constituting 
about 10% to 20% of civil rights comments for most nominees. 
Comments in this subissue, as shown above, were most prominent in the 
Goldberg, Burger, and, to a lesser extent, Breyer hearings.  Most of the 
Goldberg hearing comments within this subissue occurred within an 
exchange between Goldberg and Senator Ervin in which Ervin (continuing 
his post-Brown assault on the Court) asked Goldberg questions such as 
whether he agreed that ―every American citizen has a right to think and to 
speak his own honest thoughts concerning all things under the sun 
including the decisions of Supreme Court majorities?‖46  Goldberg 
agreed.
47
  
The comments made at Justice Burger‘s hearing were more 
representative of the direction this subissue would take in future hearings.  
Burger, confirmed in 1969, was asked very few questions overall (see 
Figure  1) ,  but  the  ones  he  was  asked wi th in  thi s  subissue  
                                                          
 45. See, e.g., id. at 253 (describing the first gay pride parade after the Stonewall riots); 
James W. Meeker, John Dombrink & Gilbert Geis, State Law and Local Ordinances in 
California Barring Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 10 U. DAYTON L. 
REV 745, 756 (1985) (examining the development of local ordinances banning 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, beginning with the 1972 Ann Arbor ordinance).  
 46. Nomination of Arthur J. Goldberg, of Illinois, to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 23 
(1962).  
 47. Id. at 23–24. 
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area focused on a school prayer case in which the Court had just denied 
certiorari.
48
  Despite prodding from the senators, Burger refused to 
speculate on why the Court declined to hear the case.
49
  Breyer, the most 
recent nominee for whom this subissue constituted an unusually high 
percentage of civil rights comments, was likewise asked several questions 
about school prayer and the religion clauses, as well as numerous speech-
related questions.  Breyer was somewhat  
more forthcoming than Burger had been, expressing general agreement 
with the Court‘s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as set forth in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman,
50
 but refusing to give an opinion about Free Exercise cases 
such as Sherbert v. Verner
51
 and Employment Division v. Smith.
52
   
c. The right to privacy 
Discussions of privacy unrelated to abortion follow comments involving 
racial discrimination and First Amendment freedoms, constituting the third 
most commonly raised subissue in the civil rights issue area; abortion-
related privacy placed fifth, after gender and sexual orientation 
discrimination.  Non-abortion privacy discussions constitute 14.7% of the 
civil rights comments, while abortion rights comments comprise 12.2% of 
that issue area. 
The temporal variation involving non-abortion-related and abortion-
related privacy comments appears in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 reports the 
percentage of civil rights commentary involving privacy unrelated to 
abortion, while Figure 8 illustrates the percentage of civil rights 
commentary that touched on abortion rights.  Note that the delineation of 
abortion and non-abortion privacy comments is important here. Because of 
the nominees‘ (and perhaps the senators‘) reluctance to address abortion-
related questions directly, abortion as an issue is frequently addressed 
through proxy debates, usually involving contraception or Griswold v. 
Connecticut,
53
 the 1965 decision that established the right of married 
c o u p l e s  t o  u s e  
  
                                                          
 48. See Nomination of Warren E. Burger, of Virginia, to be Chief Justice of the United 
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 18–19 (1969) (question about Stein 
v. Oshinksy). 
 49. See id. at 19 (insisting that it would not be appropriate to analyze the Court‘s 
reasoning for denying certiorari).  
 50. 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
 51. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 52. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  For Breyer‘s discussion of these cases at his hearing, see The 
Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 153, 223–24 (1995). 
 53. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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contraception.
54
  To ensure that abortion-related comments were not 
thereby undercounted in the data, we coded comments involving 
contraception and Griswold as involving abortion rights.  Non-abortion 
privacy, consequently, consists primarily of comments involving personal 
or informational privacy, such as police wiretapping, employee drug 
testing, and privacy of medical records.  
This distinction between the two types of privacy comments explains the 
prevalence of privacy as a subissue at Justice Rehnquist‘s first confirmation 
hearing in 1971—two years before Roe was decided—as reported in Figure 
7.  Also of note is that abortion and non-abortion privacy comments 
c o n s t i t u t e  a  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  
percentage of the civil rights comments at the Bork hearing:  the 
distribution of civil rights comments at that hearing was fairly even (as 
among the category‘s subissues).  Abortion and privacy concerns, in other 
words, did not dominate that hearing.  Issues of race discrimination, gender 
discrimination, speech and religious freedoms, and non-abortion privacy all 
played roughly equivalent roles.  
 That comments on abortion rights constitute a relatively small 
percentage (12.2%) of the civil rights observations in the dataset may be 
less surprising than it initially appears.  Our dataset goes back to 1939, and 
abortion only became a controversial constitutional issue after 1973, the 
year Roe v. Wade was decided.  What is more surprising than the relative 
scarcity of abortion comments overall, therefore, may be the fact that such 
comments have not played a larger role even in the post-Roe era.  As 
shown in Figure 8, abortion rights comments have constituted more than 
20% of the civil rights observations in only four of the thirteen post-Roe 
hearings:  those of O‘Conner, Souter, Roberts and Alito. Moreover, even 
though Roe was decided in 1973, abortion did not become an issue in the 
hearings until the 1981 O‘Connor hearing.  Post-Roe dialogue concerning 
abortion rights constituted 15.6% of all civil rights discussions, comprising 
only 5% of all post-Roe comments in the dataset.  Clearly, abortion as a 
hearing issue took some time to gain traction and failed to dominate the 
hearings even after it did.   
3. Judicial philosophy 
Judicial philosophy is the third most frequently occurring issue following 
chatter and civil rights.  Comments about judicial philosophy, which 
include such things as discussions of constitutional interpretation, stare 
decisis and judicial activism, constitute 12.4% of the comments in the 
dataset. 
                                                          
 54. Id. at 485. 
  
Figure 9 reports the percentage of comments involving judicial 
philosophy for each nominee in the data. Our findings regarding judicial 
philosophy are particularly noteworthy, in that many commentators, 
senators, and legal scholars argue that this should be the primary area of 
senatorial questioning.
55
  Clearly, neither the senators nor the nominees 
have conformed to such a practice:  the substantive area of civil rights 
comprises more than twice as many comments in our dataset than do 
comments about judicial philosophy.
56
  Moreover, this focus on issues less 
esoteric than judicial philosophy has been remarkably consistent over time. 
With the exception of the White and Goldberg hearings, the percentage 
of comments involving judicial philosophy at the hearings has rarely 
exceeded 20% and has consistently been in a range of approximately 10% 
to 20% of hearing comments.  This is consistent with Professors Guliuzza, 
Reagan, and Barrett‘s finding that Judge Bork was not asked more 
questions about what they labeled ―constitutionalism‖ than were other 
nominees.
57
  It is, however, as noted above, inconsistent with much of the 
rhetoric about how hearings ―should‖ be conducted.58 
Note that the judicial philosophy issue area is limited to observations in 
which the comment is specifically about constitutional interpretation and/or 
the nominee‘s preferred method thereof. When interpretive concerns are 
raised in the context of discussion about a particular substantive issue, 
coders were instructed to code by that issue.  So, for example, a comment 
such as that cited above by Senator Ervin, in which he asks Justice Stewart 
about interpretive methods within a discussion of Brown, would be coded 
as a civil rights comment.  As pointed out in the above discussion, 
however, this coding rule in practice probably still over-counts judicial 
philosophy comments because comments in which the substantive issue 
area is not raised will be coded as comments about judicial philosophy  
                                                          
 55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (suggesting the significant role that judges 
play in molding one‘s constitutional values).   
 56. Republican senators asked more questions about judicial philosophy than did 
Democratic senators.  See infra Part C (examining the role of partisanship in voting 
behavior among Senators). 
 57. See Guliuzza et al., supra note 5 (discussing findings on the types of questions 
asked at the Bork hearing).  
 58. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing some commentators‘ 
suggestion that Bork‘s nomination hearings changed the confirmation process into the 
partisan affairs they are today). 
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regardless of the senator‘s motivation in asking the question.  Clearly, 
therefore, the hearings are and have since their inception been more 
focused on substantive, policy-laden issues of constitutional law rather than 
on abstracted debates about theories of constitutional interpretation.  
4. Criminal justice 
Criminal justice is the last of the top four issue areas addressed at the 
hearings.  As shown on Table 1, dialogue involving criminal justice issues 
comprises 8.6% of the comments in the dataset.  This issue area includes 
topics such as the rights of criminal defendants, organized crime, and 
juvenile justice. Figure 10 indicates the percentage of comments dedicated 
to criminal justice issues by nominee.  Justice Jackson, who had been 
Attorney General at the time of his nomination, faced the highest 
percentage of questions within this issue area, and made the most 
comments about it.  It also was a frequently occurring issue in both of the 
Fortas hearings (associate and chief justice) and in the Marshall hearing, as 
well as in Rehnquist‘s associate justice hearing.  Yet, debates involving 
criminal justice policy have constituted only a small percentage of civil 
rights dialogue in more contemporary hearings. 
C. Issue Areas and Partisan Affiliation 
Partisanship plays a central role in the American political system.  
Within the electoral realm, voters overwhelmingly support candidates who 
share their party identification.
59
  In the legislative arena, partisan 
affiliation remains an excellent predictor of voting behavior among 
senators and representatives.
60
  Of course, the judiciary is no different.  
Indeed, study after study reveals the paramount importance of partisanship 
in influencing the choices judges make.
61
  
                                                          
 59. See generally ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER 136–142 (1960) 
(reporting statistical findings on the impact of party identification on voting behavior); 
accord Larry M. Bartels, Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
35, 35 (2000) (evaluating the relationship between party loyalties and voting behavior). 
 60. See, e.g., Gregory L. Hager & Jeffery C. Talbert, Look for the Party Label:  Party 
Influences on Voting in the U.S. House, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 75, 94 (2000) (analyzing the 
correlation between the behavior of members of Congress and their party affiliation); 
Samuel C. Patterson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Party Voting in the United States Congress, 18 
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 111, 128–29 (1988) (concluding that congressional representatives 
generally vote along party lines but finding differences between the House and the Senate in 
the propensity for voting along party lines). 
 61. See Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts:  A 
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999) (reaching the conclusion that party 
affiliation influences the decisions of judges in American courts); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., 
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 17–22 (2006) 
(conducting research on the occurrence of ideological voting in over six thousand published 
three-judge panel decisions and finding strong evidence of partisan voting among judges). 
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Despite the voluminous body of scholarship devoted to examining the 
effect of partisanship throughout the American political and legal arenas, 
we know very little about how partisanship affects the questions senators 
ask at confirmation hearings of Supreme Court justices.  We rectify this 
state of affairs by exploring below the issues that Democratic and 
Republican senators and nominees address, in addition to examining 
whether Democratic senators ask different questions of Republican 
nominees (and vice versa).  Taken as a whole, we find that there are 
substantial differences involving the types of questions asked and answered 
by Democrats and Republicans. 
1. The effect of partisan affiliation  
We begin by assessing the issues addressed by Democratic and 
Republican senators and nominees, which appear in Tables 4 and 5.  The 
first two columns in these tables report the percentage of comments 
representing each issue area.  The third columns indicate the p-values 
corresponding to two-tailed, unpaired difference of means tests.  This 
allows us to establish whether there are statistically significant differences 
between the issue areas Democratic and Republican senators and nominees 
address.  For ease of interpretation, p-values appearing in bold denote that 
the difference of means is statistically significant at p < 0.05 using two-
tailed tests. 
Table 4 reports the issues addressed by Democratic and Republican 
senators.  Several notable differences emerge.  First, Democratic senators 
more often engaged nominees in chatter than did Republican senators. In 
part, this reflects the fact that 71% of the comments made by senators 
occurred during periods of Democratic control of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, in which a Democratic senator served as chair.  Second, 
Republican senators more often asked nominees about judicial philosophy 
and statutory interpretation than did Democratic senators.  With regard to 
judicial philosophy, 14% of the questions from Republican senators 
involved the nominees‘ preferred method of constitutional interpretation, 
compared to only 9.4% of questions from Democrats.  Regarding statutory 
interpretation, 1.4% of the questions from Republican senators queried 
nominees as to issues involving legislative intent and history, while 
Democrats only addressed this issue in 0.4% of questions.  Third, 
Democratic senators focused more attention on criminal justice than did 
their Republican counterparts.  While 8.9% of questions from Democrats 
touched on criminal justice issues, only 5.8% of questions from 
Republicans did so. 
  
  
Table 4. The Issues Addressed by Democratic and Republican Senators at the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2009 
Issue     Democratic  Republican               P-value 
       Senators    Senators              for t-test 
 
Hearing Administration/Chatter  43.3% (4,258)  39.4% (2,400)  <0.001 
Civil Rights    26.5% (2,601)  27.3% (1,665)  0.223 
Judicial Philosophy   9.4% (923)  14.0% (854)  <0.001 
Criminal Justice    8.9% (878)  5.8% (353)  <0.001 
Government Operations   3.1% (304)  3.6% (217)  0.105 
Court Administration   3.1% (304)  2.7% (162)  0.115 
Federalism    1.0% (98)  1.3% (79)  0.079 
Statutory Interpretation   0.4% (39)  1.4% (88)  <0.001 
Banking and Finance   0.9% (89)  0.6% (34)  0.015 
Labor and Employment   0.8% (74)  0.4% (24)  0.005 
Standing/Access to Courts   0.6% (56)  0.6% (35)  0.968 
Best/Favorite Justices   0.3% (33)  0.4% (25)  0.447 
National Defense    0.2% (24)  0.6% (35)  0.001 
Other Issues    1.6% (153)  2.0% (123)  0.030 
 
Totals      100.1% (9,834)  100.1% (6,094)   
 
The unit of analysis is the change of speaker. The entries in columns one and two represent the percentage of comments 
regarding each issue area. The percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding. The numbers in parentheses indicate 
the total number of comments pertaining to each issue area. The entries in column three report the p-values 
corresponding to two-tailed, unpaired difference of means tests. P-value entries appearing in bold indicate that the 
difference of means is statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed tests). Issue areas representing less than 0.4% of the 
column totals in Table 1 are combined into the “Other Issues” category. The data contain information on Supreme 
Court nominees, both confirmed and unconfirmed, who appeared in front of an open session of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee since 1939. 
Table 5. The Issues Addressed by Democratic and Republican Nominees who Testified at the Senate 
Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2009 
Issue     Democratic  Republican  P-value 
      Nominees   Nominees              for t-test 
 
Hearing Administration/Chatter  21.8% (681)  28.1% (2,453)  <0.001 
Civil Rights    29.3% (914)  35.4% (3.089)  <0.001 
Judicial Philosophy   14.5% (453)  13.9% (1,214)  0.398 
Criminal Justice    20.3% (635)  6.0% (526)  <0.001 
Government Operations   2.2% (68)  4.8% (417)  <0.001 
Court Administration   1.9% (59)  4.4% (387)  <0.001 
Federalism    1.0% (32)  1.7% (145)  0.012 
Statutory Interpretation   1.6% (49)  0.9% (78)  0.002 
Banking and Finance   1.7% (53)  0.8% (67)  <0.001 
Labor and Employment   0.6% (19)  0.9% (77)  0.144 
Standing/Access to Courts   0.6% (18)  0.8% (67)  0.279 
Best/Favorite Justices   0.4% (12)  0.5% (46)  0.328 
National Defense    0.4% (12)  0.5% (43)  0.446 
Other Issues    3.8% (118)  1.5% (129)  <0.001  
 
Totals     100.1% (3,123)  100.2% (8,738)   
 
The unit of analysis is the change of speaker. The entries in columns one and two represent the percentage of comments 
regarding each issue area. The percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding. The numbers in parentheses indicate 
the total number of comments pertaining to each issue area. The entries in column three report the p-values 
corresponding to two-tailed, unpaired difference of means tests. P-value entries appearing in bold indicate that the 
difference of means is statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed tests). Issue areas representing less than 0.4% of the 
column totals in Table 1 are combined into the “Other Issues” category. The data contain information on Supreme 
Court nominees, both confirmed and unconfirmed, who appeared in front of an open session of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee since 1939. 
  
Several additional differences are apparent from our data.  For example, 
Democratic senators focused more attention on banking and finance and 
labor and employment than did Republicans, while Republicans asked 
three times as many questions regarding national defense than did 
Democrats.  For all of the other issues reported in Table 4, the differences 
between the issues raised by Democratic and Republican senators fail to 
attain statistical significance. 
Table 5 provides information on the issues addressed by Democratic and 
Republican nominees.  Interestingly, while Democratic senators more often 
engaged nominees in chatter, as compared to Republican senators, 
Republican nominees partook in 6% more chatter than Democratic 
nominees.  Also note that Republican nominees spoke more to civil rights 
issues than Democratic nominees.  Specifically, Republican nominees 
addressed civil rights issues in 35.4% of their comments, while Democratic 
nominees touched on civil rights issues only 29.3% of the time.  This may 
evidence an effort on the part of Republican nominees to respond to 
skepticism from Democratic senators regarding their commitment to 
preserving constitutional protection for various civil rights. 
The biggest difference in terms of the issue areas addressed by 
Democratic and Republican nominees, however, involves criminal justice.  
More than one-fifth of the comments made by Democratic nominees 
involved criminal justice, compared to only 6% of the comments made by 
Republican nominees.  Notably, while Democratic nominees spoke to 
statutory interpretation more often than Republican nominees, there is no 
statistically significant difference in terms of comments regarding the 
nominees‘ preferred methods of judicial interpretation.  Thus, while it is 
evident that Republican senators asked more questions about judicial 
philosophy than did Democratic senators, the nominees themselves 
addressed this issue in more or less equal terms.  
There are additional differences that emerge from Table 5. In particular, 
Republican nominees commented on government operations, court 
administration, and federalism roughly twice as often as Democratic 
nominees, while Democratic nominees more frequently addressed issues 
involving banking and finance. 
2. The interaction of the partisanship of senators and nominees 
Thus far, we have provided information regarding comments addressed 
by Democratic and Republican senators and nominees.  We have not, 
however, presented a description of the variation in the issues addressed in 
confirmation hearings by the party affiliation of the senator and that of the 
nominee.  This is vital information in that it affords us an opportunity to 
determine if, for example, Democratic and Republican senators ask 
  
different questions of Democratic nominees.  Inasmuch as party affiliation 
is a vital component of Senate confirmation hearings, such an analysis 
allows us to delve deeper into the partisanship that permeates the Senate 
confirmation process.  
Table 6 reports the issues addressed by Democratic and Republican 
senators by nominee partisanship.  Columns one, two, four, and five 
represent the percentage of comments in each issue area, while columns 
three and six report the p-values corresponding to two-tailed, unpaired 
difference of means tests. As before, to aid in interpretation, we have 
bolded p-values denoting that the difference of means between Democratic 
and Republican senators is statistically significant at p < 0.05 using two-
tailed tests. 
Beginning with hearing administration and chatter, Table 6 reveals that 
Democratic senators engaged in substantially more non-substantive 
questioning of Democratic nominees than did Republican senators.  
Specifically, 42.6% of the comments made by Democratic senators to 
Democratic nominees involved hearing administration and chatter, while 
only 28.5% of comments made by Republican senators to Democratic 
nominees involved non- substantive discussions.  However, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the amount of commentary 
regarding hearing administration and chatter with regard to Democratic and 
Republican senators facing Republican nominees.  
The results regarding partisanship and civil rights commentary are 
particularly interesting.  On the one hand, Republican senators engaged 
Democratic nominees in far more questioning pertaining to civil rights 
(30.6%) than did Democratic senators (18.5%). On the other hand, 
Democratic senators partook in slightly more civil rights interrogation with 
regard to Republican nominees (29.3%) than did Republican senators 
(26.2%).  This suggests that members of the opposing party of the nominee 
are especially likely to press that nominee on civil rights issues, no doubt in 
an attempt to discern how closely the nominee meshes with his or her 
political party‘s stance on the pressing civil rights issues of the day.  
Table 6 also illustrates that Republican senators dominated conversations 
regarding judicial philosophy, statutory interpretation, and national 
defense, regardless of the nominee‘s partisanship. Indeed, 14.5% of the 
q u e s t i o n s  f r o m  R e p u b l i c a n  s e n a t o r s  t o  
  
Democratic nominees involved judicial philosophy, compared to 9.8% of 
questions from Democratic senators.  Similarly, 13.9% of questions from 
Republican senators to Republican nominees implicated judicial 
philosophy, while only 9.2% of questions from Democratic senators to 
Republican nominees touched on this issue area.  Republican senators also 
queried Democratic nominees about statutory interpretation more than 
twice as often as Democratic senators, and they interrogated Republican 
nominees on this issue almost four times as often as Democratic nominees.  
Further, Republicans addressed issues of national security about twice as 
often as their Democratic counterparts, regardless of nominee partisanship 
Table 6. The Issues Addressed by Democratic and Republican Senators, by Nominee Partisanship, at the 
Senate Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2009 
      Democratic Nominees   
   Democratic  Republican P-value  
Issue     Senators   Senators for t-test 
 
Hearing Administration/Chatter 
 
42.6% (1,114) 
 
28.5% (442) 
 
<0.001  
Civil Rights  18.5% (483) 30.6% (475)  <0.001  
Judicial Philosophy 9.8% (256)  14.5% (225) <0.001 
Criminal Justice  19.4% (508)  12.2% (190)  <0.001  
Government Operations 1.5% (40)  2.6% (40)  0.017  
Court Administration  2.1% (55)  0.3% (4)  <0.001  
Federalism   0.6% (15)  1.2% (18)  0.039  
Statutory Interpretation  0.8% (21)  2.0% (31)  <0.001  
Banking and Finance  1.6% (43)  0.8% (12)  0.017  
Labor and Employment  0.4% (10)  0.7% (11)  0.150  
Standing/Access to Courts  0.3% (8)  0.9% (14)  0.010  
Best/Favorite Justices  0.3% (8)  0.1% (1)  0.105  
National Defense   0.2% (4)  0.5% (7)  0.070  
Other Issues   1.9% (50)  5.3% (82)  <0.001  
    
Totals    100% (2,615) 100.2% (1,552)  
    
  Republican Nominees    
 Democratic  Republican P-value 
Issue  Senators   Senators  for t-test  
 
Hearing Administration/Chatter 
 
43.5% (3,144) 
 
43.1% (1,958) 
 
0.637 
Civil Rights  29.3% (2,118)  26.2% (1,190)  <0.001 
Judicial Philosophy 9.2% (667)  13.9% (629) <0.001 
Criminal Justice  5.1% (370)  3.6% (163)  <0.001 
Government Operations 3.7% (264)  3.9% (177)  0.505 
Court Administration  3.5% (249)  3.5% (158)  0.932 
Federalism   1.2% (83)  1.3% (61)  0.354 
Statutory Interpretation  0.3% (18)  1.3% (57)  <0.001 
Banking and Finance  0.6% (46)  0.5% (22)  0.287 
Labor and Employment  0.9% (64)  0.3% (13)  <0.001  
Standing/Access to Courts  0.7% (48)  0.5% (21)  0.161  
Best/Favorite Justices  0.4% (25)  0.5% (24)  0.136 
National Defense   0.3% (20)  0.6% (28)  0.005 
Other Issues   1.4% (103)  0.9% (41)  0.012 
    
Totals    100.1% (7,219)  100.1% (4,542)   
 
The unit of analysis is the change of speaker. The entries in columns one, two, four, and five represent the percentage of 
comments regarding each issue area. The percentages do not necessarily sum to 100% due to rounding. The numbers in 
parentheses indicate the total number of comments pertaining to each issue area. The entries in column three and six 
report the p-values correponding to two-tailed, unpaired difference of means tests. P-value entries appearing in bold 
indicate that the difference of means is statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed tests). Issue areas representing less 
than 0.4% of the column totals in Table 1 are combined into the “Other Issues” category. The data contain information 
on Supreme Court nominees, both confirmed and unconfirmed, who appeared in front of an open session of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee since 1939. 
  
(although the p-value corresponding to Democratic nominees is only 
significant at 0.070).  
These figures reveal that, in a real way, the Republican Party has taken 
ownership of inquisitions regarding judicial philosophy, statutory 
interpretation, and national defense at the confirmation hearings—
irrespective of whether the nominee was appointed by a Democratic or 
Republican president.
62
  Even among Republican senators, however, such 
queries constitute only 16% of all of the comments those senators made at 
the hearings.  
While it is apparent that Republican senators focused substantial 
attention on questions involving judicial philosophy, statutory 
interpretation, and national security, Table 6 illustrates the fact that 
Democratic senators more often canvassed nominees of both political 
stripes regarding criminal justice issues than did Republicans.  In 
particular, 19.4% of questions from Democratic senators to Democratic 
nominees involved criminal justice, compared to 12.2% of questions from 
Republican senators.  With regard to Republican nominees, 5.1% of 
questions from Democrats involved criminal rights, while only 3.6% of 
queries from Republican senators touched on this issue.  Thus, 
notwithstanding the fact that the appointment of ―law and order‖ judges is 
most commonly associated with the Republican Party, and Richard Nixon 
in particular,
63
 Democratic senators, perhaps in an effort to secure Warren 
Court precedents involving the rights of the criminally accused, focused on 
this issue much more often than did their Republican counterparts.  
The remaining issue areas reported in Table 6 exhibit less consistent 
variation.  For example, while Republican senators engaged Democratic 
nominees in more discussions of government operations, federalism, and 
access to courts than did Democratic senators, these differences do not hold 
for Republican nominees.  In addition, Table 5 reveals that Democratic 
senators asked more questions of Democratic nominees regarding banking 
and finance, and more questions of Republican nominees involving labor 
and employment, than Republican senators, but these differences do not 
                                                          
 62. See generally Noah Kaplan et al., Dialogue in American Political Campaigns?  An 
Examination of Issue Convergence in Candidate Television Advertising, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
724, 731 (2006) (applying the issue ownership theory in the context of candidate television 
advertising); John R. Petrocik et al., Issue Ownership and Presidential Campaigning, 1952–
2000, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 599, 599–600 (2003) (discussing issue ownership theory in 
presidential elections from 1952 to 2000). 
 63. E.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 181 (2002) (stating that Nixon promised in his 1968 
campaign to ―appoint justices who would support the ‗peace forces‘ of society instead of 
those who favored the rights of accused criminals‖); C.K. Rowland & Bridget Jeffery Todd, 
Where You Stand Depends on Who Sits:  Platform Promises and Judicial Gatekeeping in the 
Federal District Courts, 53 J. POL. 175, 176 (1991) (acknowledging Nixon‘s explicit 
promise to appoint judges committed to ―law and order‖).  
  
apply to Republican nominees for banking and finance and Democratic 
nominees with respect to labor and employment.   
D. Nominee Race and Gender 
Issues of gender and race have garnered substantial attention with regard 
to the nomination and confirmation of federal judges.
64
  This is perhaps no 
more evident than in Justice O‘Connor‘s comments regarding President 
George W. Bush‘s first choice to succeed her on the Court.  In opining 
about the nomination of Judge John Roberts to fill her seat, O‘Connor 
noted, ―He‘s good in every way, except he‘s not a woman.‖65 Similar 
notions exist with regard to the importance of diversifying the Court in 
terms of its racial composition.  For example, some have attributed 
President George H. W. Bush‘s choice of Judge Clarence Thomas to the 
fact Bush needed to fill the ―black seat‖ vacated by Thurgood Marshall.66  
Despite the fact that issues of race and gender have become staples of 
nomination and confirmation rhetoric, we know surprisingly little about 
whether racial minorities and women are treated differently in Senate 
confirmation hearings.  We rectify this lacuna by investigating the types of 
questions senators ask minority nominees for the purpose of determining if 
the issues facing women and racial minority nominees differ from those 
posed to white male nominees. 
Table 7 reports the issues addressed by senators, separated by nominee 
race and gender.  Columns one and two represent the percentage of 
                                                          
 64. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr. et al., Gender, Critical Mass, and Judicial Decision 
Making, 32 L. & POL‘Y 260, 265–66, (2010) (noting the substantial strides women have 
made in becoming federal judges over the past thirty years); Lisa A. Solowiej et al., 
Partisan Politics:  The Impact of Party in the Confirmation of Minority and Female Federal 
Court Nominees, 11 PARTY POL. 557, 569–70 (2005) (determining that women judicial 
nominees are most advantaged under unified Republican control of Congress and the 
Presidency and most disadvantaged under divided control with a Democratic President); 
Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench:  Policy 
and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 613–14 (1985) (reporting findings that minority 
and female judges do not advocate for race or gender motivated interests); Jennifer L. 
Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter:  Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal 
Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761 (2005) (analyzing over five hundred federal 
appellate cases decided from 1999–2001 to find that plaintiffs in sexual harassment or sex 
discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were twice as likely to 
prevail when the judge was female). 
 65. Dan Balz & Darryl Fears, Some Disappointed Nominee Won‟t Add Diversity to 
Court, WASH. POST, July 21, 2005, at A15. 
 66. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 51, 231 (5th 
ed. 2008) (asserting that Lyndon Johnson‘s nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the 
Supreme Court established ―a black seat‖ on the bench); Thomas R. Marshall, The Supreme 
Court and the Grass Roots:  Whom Does the Court Represent Best?, 76 JUDICATURE 22, 23 
(1992) (stating that the existence of a ―black seat‖ and a ―woman‘s seat‖ are the ―clearest 
concessions to group representation‖); Barbara A. Perry & Henry J. Abraham, A 
„Representative‟ Supreme Court?  The Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer Appointments, 81 
JUDICATURE 158, 159 (1998) (arguing that Clarence Thomas‘ nomination was 
―unquestionably‖ motivated by race). 
  
comments in each issue for minority nominees (column one) and white 
nominees (column two).
67
  Columns four and five indicate the percentage 
of comments in each issue area for female nominees (column four) and 
male nominees (column five).  Column three reports the p-values 
corresponding to two-tailed, unpaired difference of means tests that 
compare minority nominees to white nominees. Column six provides this 
same information with respect to female and male nominees.  To assist in 
interpretation of these statistics, we have bolded p-values denoting that the 
difference of means between minority and white nominees, and female and 
male nominees, is statistically significant at p < 0.05 using two-tailed tests.  
Several notable differences emerge from Table 7. First, it is evident that 
senators engaged in less chatter for both minority and female nominees.  
Hearing administration and chatter represents 36.2% of the comments 
made by senators to minority nominees, compared to 42.9% for white 
nominees.  Similarly, chatter represents 39.3% of senatorial commentary 
for female nominees, compared to 42.2% for male nominees.  This 
distinction is particularly striking given that a nominee‘s personal 
background—frequently discussed in celebratory terms in the hearings of 
minority and female nominees—are included within the chatter issue area.  
This indicates that senators have engaged minority and female nominees in 
more substantive questioning than white male nominees.  
                                                          
 67. Marshall, Sotomayor, and Thomas represent the minority nominees, while 
Ginsburg, O‘Connor, and Sotomayor represent the female nominees.  Note that Professor 
Ringhand has posited that Frankfurter was perceived to be a minority nominee during his 
confirmation hearing.  Lori A. Ringhand, Aliens on the Bench:  Lessons in Identity, Race 
and Politics from the First “Modern” Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing to Today, 2011 
MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).  When we include Frankfurter among the minority 
nominees, the results do not substantively change.  Note also that we examined the 
distinctions between minority nominees and white nominees using hearings beginning with 
Marshall.  None of our conclusions changed in any meaningful way.  However, when we 
compare female nominees to male nominees using the 1981 to 2009 time period (beginning 
with O‘Connor) three minor differences emerge.  First, we find that male nominees are 
asked statistically significantly more questions regarding civil rights than female nominees.  
In other words, the p-value pertaining to civil rights becomes significant at p < 0.001.  
Second, we find that female nominees are presented with statistically significantly more 
questions regarding criminal justice than males.  Finally, we discover that male nominees 
are asked statistically significantly more questions regarding statutory interpretation than 
females.  That is, the p-value corresponding to statutory interpretation becomes significant 
at p = 0.003. 
  
Second, senators pressed minority and female nominees much more 
heavily with regard to their judicial philosophies.  Indeed, 14.2% of the 
questions from senators to minority nominees involved their preferred 
means of judicial interpretation, compared to 10.6% of questions for white 
nominees, while 13.9% of interrogatories addressed to female nominees 
involved judicial philosophy, compared to 10.8% for male nominees.  As 
such, it is evident that senators are particularly interested in grilling female 
and minority nominees regarding their approaches to constitutional 
interpretation.  
Table 7. The Issues Addressed by Senators, by Nominee Race and Gender, at the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2009 
             Nominee Race    
    Minority      White   P-value  
Issue   Nominees   Nominees for t-test  
    
Hearing Administration/Chatter 36.2% (970)  42.9% (5,688)  <0.001 
Civil Rights  27.3% (733)  26.7% (3,533)  0.475  
Judicial Philosophy 14.2% (380)  10.6% (1,397)  <0.001  
Criminal Justice  15.2% (407)  6.2% (824)  <0.001  
Government Operations 1.5% (40)  3.6% (481)  <0.001  
Court Administration 1.3% (34)  3.3% (432)  <0.001  
Federalism 0.5% (14)  1.2% (163)  0.001  
Statutory Interpretation 0.4% (11)  0.9% (116)  0.014  
Banking and Finance 1.5% (39)  0.6% (84)  <0.001  
Labor and Employment 0.6% (16)  0.6% (82)  0.893  
Standing/Access to Courts 0.2% (4)  0.7% (87)  0.002   
Best/Favorite Justices 0.3% (7)  0.4% (51)  0.331  
National Defense  0.4% (10)  0.4% (49)  0.981  
Other Issues 0.6% (16)  2.0% (260)  <0.001  
    
Totals  100.2% 
(2,681) 
100.1% (13,247)  
    
             Nominee Gender                  
    Female           Male    P-value 
Issue   Nominees   Nominees for t-test  
    
Hearing Administration/Chatter 39.3% (809)  42.2% (5,849)  0.014 
Civil Rights  25.3% (520)  27.0 (3,746)  0.096 
Judicial Philosophy 13.9% (286)  10.8% (1,491)  <0.001 
Criminal Justice  5.5% (113)  8.1% (1,118)  <0.001 
Government Operations 2.3% (48)  3.4% (473)  0.010 
Court Administration 4.1% (84)  2.8% (382)  <0.001 
Federalism 1.5% (31)  1.1% (146)  0.067 
Statutory Interpretation 0.5% (10)  0.8% (117)  0.089 
Banking and Finance 1.8% (36)  0.6% (87)  <0.001 
Labor and Employment 0.6% (12)  0.6% (86)  0.842  
Standing/Access to Courts 1.0% (21)  0.5% (70)  0.004 
Best/Favorite Justices 0.3% (7)  0.4% (51)  0.846 
National Defense  0.3% (7)  0.4% (52)  0.809 
Other Issues 3.6% (74)  1.5% (202)  <0.001 
    
Totals  100% (2,058)  100.2% (13,870)   
 
The unit of analysis is the change of speaker. The entries in columns one, two, four, and five represent the percentage of 
comments regarding each issue area. The percentages do not necessarily sum to 100% due to rounding. The numbers in 
parentheses indicate the total number of comments pertaining to each issue area. The entries in columns three and six 
report the p-values corresponding to two-tailed, unpaired difference of means tests. P-value entries appearing in bold 
indicate that the difference of means is statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed tests). Issue areas representing less 
than 0.4% of the column totals in Table 1 are combined into the “Other Issues” category. The data contain information 
on Supreme Court nominees, both confirmed and unconfirmed, who appeared in front of an open session of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee since 1939. Nominees Marshall, Sotomayor, and Thomas represent the minority nominees, while 
nominees Ginsburg, O’Connor, and Sotomayor represent the female nominees
  
Third, female and minority nominees received fewer questions involving 
government operations and more questions implicating banking and 
finance.  Senators pressed minority nominees on issues related to 
governmental operations, such as the separation of powers system, in only 
1.5% of comments, while they queried white nominees about this topic 
3.3% of the time.  Female nominees received slightly more questions on 
government operations than minority nominees (2.3%), but not as many 
questions as male nominees (3.4%).  In addition, white nominees and male 
nominees were asked about banking and finance more than twice as often 
as minority and female nominees. 
While minority and female nominees share the differences discussed 
above, Table 7 reveals several points of departure.  For example, minority 
nominees were interrogated with respect to criminal justice issues 
substantially more often than white nominees.  Some 15.2% of questions 
from senators involved criminal justice for minority nominees, compared to 
only 6.2% for white nominees.  Conversely, senators interrogated male 
nominees on this issue more often than female nominees:  8.1% for male 
nominees compared to 5.5% for female nominees.  In addition, while 
minority nominees received fewer questions involving court administration 
and access to courts than did white nominees, female nominees were at the 
receiving end of more court administration and standing questions than 
male nominees.  Finally, note that minority nominees received about twice 
as many queries implicating federalism and statutory interpretation than did 
white nominees, although there is no discernable difference between male 
and female nominees with regard to these issue areas. 
III. CONCLUSIONS:  ―THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY 
THE SAME‖68 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings of Supreme Court nominees 
represent the only institutionalized opportunity for nominees to engage in a 
face-to-face dialogue with members of the legislative branch.  As part of 
the Senate‘s advise and consent role, these hearings provide information to 
senators and the American public regarding a host of issues implicating 
nominees‘ backgrounds, preferred means of judicial interpretation, and 
views on the most pressing issues of the day.  Moreover, Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearings represent a vital step as an individual makes the 
transformation from nominee to justice.  
Despite the paramount significance of Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearings, there has been surprisingly little rigorous empirical scholarship 
on the topic.  The purpose of this project is to fill this gap by contributing 
                                                          
 68.  MOE., The Ghost of Ralph‟s Mom, on DITHER (Fatboy Records 2000). 
  
to our knowledge of confirmation politics and constitutional development 
by addressing the issues discussed by nominees and senators at the 
hearings.  To do this, we created a novel dataset—the largest and most 
thorough of its kind—that tracks the issues discussed by all senators and 
nominees who testified at an open hearing of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee from 1939 to 2009. 
In a very real way, the evidence we bring to bear makes it clear that the 
past seventy years of Senate Judiciary Committee hearings have been 
marked by both continuity and change.  With regard to the number of 
comments made by nominees and senators, it is evident there was a steady 
increase in the amount of dialogue that transpires at the hearings, though it 
was Rehnquist‘s hearing for the Chief Justice position in 1986 that marked 
the most dramatic transformation, not Robert Bork‘s appearance before the 
committee in 1987.  Following Rehnquist‘s hearing, the number of 
comments made by senators and nominees effectively plateaued to the very 
high levels that continue today.  
As to the issues discussed at the hearings, our findings indicate that 
comments regarding hearing administration and chatter superabound and, 
with a few notable exceptions, this has always been the case.  Indeed, from 
1939 to 2009, more than 35% of comments involved hearing administration 
and chatter. Commentary pertaining to civil rights has exhibited more 
radical temporal change.  While there was considerable variation with 
respect to civil rights dialogue until 1970, beginning with Powell‘s hearing 
in 1971, civil rights has been the dominant substantive issue area of 
discussion.  Within the realm of civil rights, several issue areas also have 
undergone notable alteration.  For example, issues of gender and sexual 
orientation discrimination did not appear until Carswell‘s hearing in 1970, 
but these issues have subsequently represented 15% of civil rights 
discussions.  Similarly, although Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973, 
discussions of abortion did not manifest themselves at the hearings until 
O‘Connor‘s hearing in 1981.  Even since then, however, dialogue touching 
on abortion rights has constituted only 14.5% of civil rights commentary 
and 4.7% of hearing comments overall.   
We have also uncovered some important differences with respect to the 
types of questions asked by Democratic and Republican senators.  
Republican senators seem to have developed a type of issue ownership with 
regard to questions pertaining to judicial philosophy, statutory 
interpretation, and national defense, pressing nominees on these issues 
substantially more than their Democratic counterparts.  Conversely, 
Democrats interrogated nominees on criminal justice and labor relations 
issues almost twice as often as Republicans.  What is more, Democratic 
senators grilled Republican nominees on civil rights more often than 
  
Republican senators, while Republican senators queried Democratic 
nominees on this issue more often than did Democratic senators.  As such, 
it is apparent that senators from both political parties more often pressed 
nominees of the opposing party on civil rights issues, no doubt in an 
attempt to discern the extent to which the nominees‘ positions on salient 
civil rights subjects differ from their own. 
In addition to illuminating the partisan differences in terms of the issues 
addressed at confirmation hearings, our results also provide evidence that 
female and minority nominees are differently treated than more traditional 
white male nominees.  For example, senators pressed female and minority 
nominees substantially more often on issues of judicial philosophy and 
banking and finance.  Moreover, senators engaged in far less comments 
involving hearing administration and chatter for female and minority 
nominees, indicating that senators interrogated female and minority 
nominees on more substantive issues than white male nominees. 
These findings provide a solid empirical foundation for additional 
research in several emerging areas of political science and constitutional 
scholarship.  For scholars interested in exploring causal mechanisms 
explaining the connection between public opinion and the evolution of 
constitutional law, the data presented here provide useful information 
regarding how senators and nominees use the confirmation process to 
validate, refute, or debate constitutional change over time.  For those 
interested in studying the balance between judicial independence and 
judicial accountability, our data provide a useful starting point from which 
to judge the effectiveness of the confirmation hearings as a check on 
judicial power.  Finally, scholars interested in reforming or changing the 
confirmation process will find much to interest them in our data involving 
how the process has, and has not, changed over time.  
Our findings also should change the way confirmation hearings are 
discussed more generally.  For example, an awareness that substantive 
issues such as civil rights, rather than abstracted theories of constitutional 
interpretation, have long dominated the hearings may change the dialogue 
about whether there is something wrong or inappropriate about the hearings 
as they are conducted today.  The evidence regarding female and minority 
nominees should give pause to those concerned with the unique challenges 
the process presented to non-traditional nominees.  Regardless of how 
participants in the ongoing dialogue about Supreme Court confirmations 
interpret and use these findings, however, our hope is that this project will 
create a foundation for more vigorous empirical work in this area in the 
future.  
  
  
APPENDIX A 
 
  
 
THE NOMINEES APPEARING IN THE  
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS DATABASE 
 
Appendix Table 1. The Nominees who Testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2009 
Nominee          Appointing President             Year of  Outcome 
             (President’s Party)             Hearing 
 
Frankfurter   Roosevelt (D)  1939  Confirmed  
Jackson     Roosevelt (D)  1941  Confirmed  
Harlan     Eisenhower (R)  1955  Confirmed  
Brennan    Eisenhower (R)  1957  Confirmed  
Whittaker    Eisenhower (R)  1957  Confirmed  
Stewart     Eisenhower (R)  1959  Confirmed  
White     Kennedy (D)  1962  Confirmed  
Goldberg    Kennedy (D)  1962  Confirmed  
Fortas     Johnson (D)  1965  Confirmed  
Marshall    Johnson (D)   1967  Confirmed  
Fortas (Chief Justice)  Johnson (D)  1968  Withdrawn  
Thornberry    Johnson (D)  1968  Withdrawn  
Burger (Chief Justice)  Nixon (R)  1969  Confirmed  
Haynsworth    Nixon (R)  1969  Rejected   
Carswell    Nixon (R)  1970  Rejected   
Blackmun    Nixon (R)  1970  Confirmed  
Powell     Nixon (R)  1971  Confirmed  
Rehnquist    Nixon (R)  1971  Confirmed  
Stevens     Ford (R)   1975  Confirmed  
O’Connor    Reagan (R)  1981  Confirmed  
Rehnquist (Chief Justice)  Reagan (R)  1986  Confirmed  
Scalia    Reagan (R)  1986  Confirmed  
Bork     Reagan (R)  1987  Rejected   
Kennedy    Reagan (R)  1987  Confirmed  
Souter     Bush (G. H. W.) (R) 1990  Confirmed  
Thomas     Bush (G. H. W.) (R) 1991  Confirmed  
Ginsburg    Clinton (D)  1993  Confirmed  
Breyer     Clinton (D)  1994  Confirmed  
Roberts (Chief Justice)  Bush (G. W.) (R)  2005  Confirmed  
Alito     Bush (G. W.) (R)  2006  Confirmed  
Sotomayor    Obama (D)  2009  Confirmed  
 
(D) denotes Democratic president; (R) denotes Republican president. 
 
  
APPENDIX B 
  
THE ISSUES AND SUBISSUES APPEARING IN THE  
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS DATABASE 
 
Appendix Table 2. Issues, Subissues, and Itemized Subissues Appearing in the Data  
Issue      Subissues and Itemized Subissues 
 
Macroeconomics     Taxation, Tax Policy, and Tax Reform; Price Control and 
      Stabilization; Other and General Macroeconomic Issues 
 
Civil Rights     Ethnic Minority and Racial Group Discrimination; Gender 
      and Sexual Orientation Discrimination; Age Discrimination; 
      Handicap or Disease Discrimination; Voting Rights and Issues; 
      Freedom of Speech and Religion; Right to Privacy and Access to 
      Government Information; Abortion; Anti-Government 
      Activities; Second Amendment; Speech: Political Speech and  
      Campaign Finance; Speech: Commercial; Speech: Obscenity and 
      Pornography; Speech: Other; Religion: Free Exercise; Religion: 
      Establishment; Other Civil Rights Issues 
 
Health      Comprehensive Health Care Reform; Regulation of Drug 
      Industry; Medical Devices, and Clinical Labs; Provider  
      and Insurer Payment and Regulation; Prevention,  
      Communicable Diseases and Health Promotion; Long- 
      term Care, Home Health, Terminally Ill, and Rehabilitation  
      Services; Research and Development; Other Health Issues 
 
Labor and Employment    Worker Safety and Protection, Occupational and Safety 
      Health Administration (OSHA); Employment Benefits;  
      Employee Relations and Labor Unions; Fair Labor 
      Standards; Parental Leave and Child Care; Immigration 
      and Refugee Issues; Other Labor and Employment Issues 
 
Education     Higher Education; Elementary and Secondary Education;  
      Education of Underprivileged Students; Special Education;  
      Other Education Issues 
 
Environment     Drinking Water Safety; Hazardous Waste and Toxic  
      Chemical Regulation, Treatment, and Disposal; Species 
      and Forest Protection; Other Environment Issues 
 
Energy      Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
      Issues; Natural Gas and Oil; Coal 
 
  
 
  
Appendix Table 2. (continued) 
Issue      Subissues and Itemized Subissues 
 
Criminal Justice     Executive Branch Agencies Dealing With Law and Crime;  
      White Collar Crime and Organized Crime; Illegal Drug 
      Production, Trafficking, and Control; Prisons; Juvenile 
      Crime and the Juvenile Justice System; Child Abuse and  
      Child Pornography; Family Issues; Police, Fire, and  
      Weapons Control; Riots and Crime Prevention; Death 
      Penalty/Capital Punishment; Miranda Rights; Double   
      Jeopardy; Search and Seizure; Right to Counsel; Self-  
      Incrimination, Involuntary Confession, Refusal to Testify;  
      Confrontation Clause, Right to Confront Witnesses   
      Against You; Habeas Corpus Reform; Other Criminal   
      Justice Issues  
 
Social Welfare     Poverty and Assistance for Low-Income Families;  
      Assistance to the Disabled and Handicapped; Other  
      Social Welfare Issues 
 
Community Development and Housing  Low and Middle Income Housing Programs and Needs 
 
Banking, Finance and Domestic Commerce   U.S. Banking System and Financial Institution Regulation;  
      Securities and Commodities Regulation; Corporate   
      Mergers, Antitrust Regulation, and Corporate    
      Management Issues; Small Business Issues and Small 
      Business Administration; Copyrights and Patents;  
      Consumer Safety and Consumer Fraud; Sports and  
      Gambling Regulation; Other Banking, Finance, and  
      Domestic Commerce Issues 
 
Defense      Military Intelligence, CIA, Espionage; Manpower, Military 
      Personnel and Dependents (Army, Navy, Air Force,  
      Marines), Military Courts; Civil Defense and Homeland 
      Security; Direct War Related Issues; Relief of Claims   
      Against U.S. Military 
 
Space, Technology and Communications  Broadcast Industry Regulation (TV, Cable, Radio);   
      Computer Industry, Computer Security, and General   
      Issues Related to the Internet 
 
International Affairs and Aid   Human Rights; International Organizations Other Than 
      Finance: United Nations (UN), UNESCO, International 
      Red Cross; Terrorism, Hijacking; Other International  
      Affairs and Aid Issues 
 
  
  
Appendix Table 2. (continued) 
Issue      Subissues and Itemized Subissues 
 
Government Operations     Intergovernmental Relations; Government Efficiency and 
      Bureaucratic Oversight; Nominations and Appointments;  
      Presidential Impeachment and Scandal; Federal  
      Government Branch Relations and Administrative  
      Issues, Congressional Operations; Regulation of  
      Political Campaigns, Political Advertising, PAC Regulation, 
      Voter Registration, Government Ethics; Relief of Claims 
      Against the U.S. Government; Constitutional Roles of the  
      President and Congress in Declaring and Waging War,  
      Limits on Presidential War Powers; Other Government  
      Operations Issues 
 
Public Land and Public Water    Native American Affairs; Natural Resources, Public Lands,  
      and Forest Management; Water Resource Development  
      and Research; U.S. Dependencies and Territorial Issues  
 
State and Local Government    State and Local Government Administration 
 
Federalism     Scope of Federal Preemption of State Law; Scope of  
      Congressional Power Under Section Five of the   
      Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendments;  
      Commerce Clause; Tenth Amendment; Eleventh   
      Amendment, State Sovereign Immunity; Other Federalism 
      Issues 
 
Miscellaneous Substantive Topics   Judicial Administration; Statutory Interpretation;   
      Best/Favorite Justices; Best/Favorite Cases or Opinions;  
      Worst Cases or Opinions; Standing/Access to Courts;   
      Non-Standing Justiciability Issues, Political Questions   
      Doctrine, Mootness and Ripeness, Advisory Opinions  
 
Judicial Philosophy/Interpretive Methods  Judicial Restraint, Activism, Humility, Deference, Hubris;  
      Original Intent, Original Meaning, Founders, Framers’   
      Purposes; Living Constitutionalism, Constitution as   
      Evolving or Incorporating Current Norms; Text as   
      Interpretive Tool; Precedent, Stare Decisis; Separation of  
      Powers; Other Judicial Philosophy Issues 
 
Hearing Administration and Chatter   Hearing Administration and Chatter; Character and   
      Background, Ethics of Nominee; Discussion of Media   
      Coverage or Spin About the Hearings of the Nominee;   
      Discussions of Pre-Hearing Conversations or Coaching or  
      Contact Between the Nominee and Executive Officials or  
      Others  
 
  
APPENDIX C 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
To conduct a reliability analysis of the data, we extracted a random 
sample of 92 pages of transcript (out of 3672 pages).  Since the average 
number of observations per page is 7.57, we sought to obtain a sample of 
~2.5% of the data.  Indeed, our sample constituted 715 observations, 
making up 2.57% of the data.  This sample size gives us precision of ± 
3.6% with 95% confidence.  An independent coder collected the data for 
the reliability sample. 
The number of observations in the main data file for the 92 pages of 
transcript is 718.  The number of observations in the random sample for the 
92 pages of transcript is 717.  Thus, five observations do not match in the 
random sample and the main data file.  As such, the agreement rate with 
regard to the number of observations is 99.3%.  Because we are unable to 
compare observations that are present in one dataset and absent from the 
other, we excluded the five non-matching observations from the reliability 
analysis.  
Because the SUBISSUE and ITEMIZED SUBISSUE variables are not 
ordered, it was necessary to order them to conduct the reliability analysis.  
For example, a discussion of protests at abortion clinics would fall under 
the general issue of civil rights, and the subissues of freedom of 
speech/religion and abortion.  Coder 1 may have ordered these such that 
ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 1 = abortion and ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 2 = 
freedom of speech/religion, while Coder 2 may have ordered these such 
that ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 1 = freedom of speech/religion and 
ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 2 = abortion.  In such an instance, both coders 
agreed that the observation contained discussions of abortion and freedom 
of speech/religion, although they ordered these issues differently.  To 
ensure the reliability analysis reflected the fact that the coders were in 
perfect agreement with respect to the subissues discussed in this example, 
the SUBISSUE and ITEMIZED SUBISSUE variables were ordered to 
match for the purpose of the reliability analysis.  
We report information pertaining to the reliability of each variable 
below.  This table reports the agreement rate for both samples, the expected 
agreement (that which would be expected by chance), along with a kappa 
statistic for each variable.  The average agreement rate for all of the 
variables is 91.23%, indicating that the data are quite reliable.  Considered 
individually, it is evident that the agreement rate between coders is very 
high, ranging from a low of 59.16% to a high of 100.0% for several 
variables.  Note the lowest agreement rates pertain to the SUBISSUE and 
ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 1 variables.  We would expect these variables to 
  
have the lowest rate of agreement in that, if the coders differed as to the 
ISSUE variable, they necessarily differ with respect to the SUBISSUE and 
ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 1 variables, as those variables represent the 
subissues and itemized subissues within the ISSUE variable. 
Although there are no firm guidelines with regard to exactly how strong 
kappa should be to determine a variable‘s reliability, Landis and Koch 
suggest that kappa values between 0.00 and 0.20 are poor; values between 
0.21 and 0.40 are fair; values between 0.41 and 0.60 are moderate; values 
between 0.61 and 0.80 are substantial; and values above 0.81 are almost 
perfect.
69
  Using this as a guide, it is evident that the data are quite reliable.  
The average kappa score over all variables is 0.893, which is almost 
perfect.  Considered individually, none of the variables performs worse 
than moderate and almost all of the variables achieve substantial to almost 
perfect reliability. 
  
                                                          
 69. Landis & Koch, supra note 28, at 165. 
 
  
 
Appendix Table 3. Reliability Analysis  
Variable                       Agreement            Expected               Kappa             Standard           Probability 
                         Rate (%)            Agreement                Error 
 
NOMINEE ID   100.0  6.98  1.000  0.010  <0.001 
YEAR    100.0  10.72  1.000  0.012  <0.001 
CITE    96.36  1.62  0.963  0.005  <0.001 
PRESIDENT’S PARTY  100.0  57.50  1.000  0.037  <0.001 
SENATE CONTROL  99.16  55.40  0.981  0.037  <0.001 
SENATOR ID   99.30  5.75  0.993  0.009  <0.001 
SENATOR’S PARTY  91.60  50.83  0.829  0.037  <0.001  
COMMITTEE CHAIR  100.0  26.16  1.000  0.021  <0.001 
SPEAKER   99.72  50.77  0.994  0.037  <0.001 
ISSUE    76.92  21.54  0.706  0.018  <0.001 
SUBISSUE   59.16  7.15  0.560  0.001  <0.001 
ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 1  63.79  12.93  0.584  0.042  <0.001 
ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 2  100.0  72.22  1.000  0.408  0.007 
ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 3     insufficient observations for calculation 
ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 4    insufficient observations for calculation 
ITEMIZED SUBISSUE 5    insufficient observations for calculation 
 
NOMINEE ID is a unique identification number given to each nominee. YEAR represents the year of the confirmation 
hearing. CITE indicates the page number of the transcript on which the observation is coded. PRESIDENT’S PARTY 
represents the political party of the president who appointed the nominee. SENATE CONTROL indicates which 
political party controlled the Senate at the time of the confirmation hearing. SENATOR ID is a unique identification 
number given to the questioning senator. SENATOR’S PARTY represents the political party of the questioning senator. 
COMMITTEE CHAIR indicates the identification number of the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee during each 
nominee’s hearing. SPEAKER indicates whether the statement being coded was made by the nominee or senator. 
ISSUE represents the main issue being discussed. SUBISSUE denotes the subissue being discussed. The ITEMIZED 
SUBISSUE variables code the itemized subissues being discussed. 
